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A Note to the Reader 
A version of this report was given November 25, 1985 as a paper on a Southern Economic 
Association (SEA) panel in Dallas devoted to the contributions of James M. Buchanan to economics, 
politics, and moral philosophy.  When SEA president-elect Bill Breit solicited this paper, I readily 
agreed since, in fact, the essay was already written early in 1985 in the form of a confidential report to 
the Nobel Prize in Economic Science Committee.  I was not permitted to reveal this at the SEA 
meetings, but with Buchanan’s Noble Prize award in fall 1986 that constraint was removed.  Thus, 
this paper is offered as an historical document1.   
 
The reader should note that the report does not cover the period 1985 to the present.  Such an 
updating would have required a much longer paper, and one that would not have changed the tenor 
of my analysis, which holds that Buchanan’s life’s work—besides creating a field along with several 
able colleagues who founded the Public Choice Society—has centered around a very simple but 
profound intellectual program: to wit, institutions matter in shaping social behavior.  Buchanan 
argues that not only do institutions shape human behavior in markets, politics, and in social life, but 
more importantly they evolve in predictable ways as key exogenous variables such as factor supply, 
information and technology, law and constitutional life, and social attitudes change. This 
neoinstitutionalist perspective is as prevalent in Buchanan’s writings before 1985 as after. 
 
Finally, before I reveal the original Nobel report, let me offer my good wishes to James Buchanan for 
more decades of productive life, and continued honor from several academic professions that would 
be the poorer without his prolific and original insights.   
                                                      
1 Minor changes from the original have been made to correct various citation and, alas, stylistic and 






This is not the first review of the work of James Buchanan, nor probably the last.  Mueller (1981) and 
Locksley (1981) offered two admirable interpretative, but narrow, essays, and Blaug (1971) has 
written a short biography with a soupçon of criticism.  That leaves me some maneuvering room and 
one in which I will present as subjective a critique as I dare, with the accompanying hope that I will 
treat issues in a slightly different manner than those aforementioned authors. 
 
Before I commence perhaps I should say a bit about my own credentials, else the reader may 
question my scrutiny of that massive list at the paper’s end, the “Key Works of James. M. 
Buchanan2.”  I was, as the reader should know, an unofficial student of Buchanan.  In spring 1962 I 
was introduced to his writings by my advisor David Davies in a Duke graduate seminar on public 
finance and his works featured in my thesis written in 1963-1965.  In 1965-1966, I was a Thomas 
Jefferson Center post-doctoral fellow at University of Virginia and studied under Buchanan.   
Between 1971 and 1973, I served with him as a colleague on the faculty at Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute.   
 
Below, I have broken Buchanan’s voluminous work into six areas, but the reader is forewarned that I 
have not devoted a separate part to examine his contributions to moral philosophy because of my 
own limitations in that area.  Nonetheless, I have briefly alluded to his contributions in this area in 
the last area surveyed on constitutional economics, a topic which Buchanan- following David Hume 
and Adam Smith- sees as closely related to moral philosophy.  Following this descriptive-
interpretative section is a short set of conclusions.   
                                                      
2 Selection of “Key Works” was based entirely upon my judgment.    
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2.  EVALUATIONS OF BUCHANAN’S WRITINGS 
 
A.  Debt, Fiscal Illusion and Keynesian Criticisms 
 
Buchanan is a sort of Keynesian, though I doubt he would accept this title.  In his writings on debt 
(B1, B5, B8, B9, M2, M3, A35, A39, C5, C6, C10, S4, S8) he clearly indicates a disbelief in the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem, i.e., the view that voters perceive the burden of the public debt as a 
claim on future taxes.  This and his belief in “tax illusions” (B3, B9, C3, C11, C18, C27, S1, O4) place 
him among the severe skeptics about the role that rational expectations play in politics.  Here he is at 
the opposite end of the spectrum from Robert Barro (1978) who holds (but offers exceedingly flimsy 
evidence) that government debt is just an efficient means of spreading public sector costs over time, 
lowering the real costs of fiscal actions in the process.  To Barro public debt is just another tax 
instrument in the optimal taxation process. 
 
I find about half of Buchanan’s writing on debt unhelpful.  Although he spends many pages 
distinguishing objective costs (the putative social cost) from subjective costs (what the voter “feels”), 
I glean no operational delineation of these early exercises, and, worse yet, I find myself confused by 
them. I have noted, however, that in recent years with his joining forces with Richard Wagner (M2, 
O4) he seems to be taking a very sensible (and potentially operational) position that the “veil of 
ignorance” in politics is difficult for the average citizen (or marginal voter) to pierce and debt can 
make informed choice difficult.  Here Buchanan is quite Downsian, arguing that there is ample room 
for bias in voter ignorance, because political entrepreneurs have incentives to make tax-costs look 
small relative to expenditure-gains.  This fraud is accentuated by the short time-horizons of the 
politicians as well as voters’ (optimal) ignorance.  George Stigler (1982) and Gary Becker (1976a, 
1976b) seem to deny this putative principal-agent misallocation, but Buchanan is quite mainstream in 
his belief that such asymmetries in information are part and parcel of public choice, a position in the 




Essentially, the usefulness of this deceitful vote-buying hypothesis hinges on empirics.  I fear that 
Buchanan’s contribution here is as much based on gut feeling as on the evidence, but Barro, Stigler, 
and Becker offer nothing more.  I believe, however, that Buchanan will be proven a bit correct and 
this extreme New Chicago position somewhat wrong.  For example, the political business cycle 
literature seems to be indicating that political delusions can and do pay as long as they are both 
infrequent and novel.  I find it paradoxical, if not ironic, that strong-form, rational expectationist 
Barro (with David Gordon 1983) has shown that the “last move” potential in government’s arsenal 
of fiscal strategies, together with the unwillingness or inability of politicians to bind themselves to 
prudent future course of action, makes for problems in constraining government.  Thus, policy 
instability emerges from this shaky principal-agent relationship- essentially, government policy is a 
lemon’s problem.  At the least, this indicates that utility of Buchanan’s call for a spending constraint 
in the U.S. federal budget and balanced budgets as well as for the adoption of broad monetary rules 
(B8, M3, M4, A42, C1, C16), a plea joined in by Old Chicagoan Milton Friedman and many others.   
 
B.  L.S.E. Cost Approach 
 
Buchanan explores the notion of opportunity cost in several places: a careful and sadly neglected 
short book (B5), in a little introduction (C2), and in several articles (C5, C11, C25, C27).  He points 
out that, strictly speaking, opportunity costs cannot be measured.  If a chooser facing alternatives A 
and B chooses A, its cost is the value of B foregone.  Because B is not chosen, however, its costs are 
not objectively ascertainable.   
 
This point is well taken in a world of heterogeneous opportunity sets where choice sets are 
discontinuous, non-repetitive, and unavailable under competitive conditions.  Empirical economists 
should read this work and take it to heart.  Still, they may not be intellectual moved.  The reason is  
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simple: if the chooser is typical, his valuation of a resource will be much like that of the market’s, 
unless there are subjective and idiosyncratic benefits or costs.  A world of brisk exchange with 
arbitrage insures that perceived or subjective non-idiosyncratic costs equal or approximate the 
objective ones.   
 
It is where markets fail to reflect marginal use value because of high transactions costs that subjective 
costs are important.  Buchanan thinks, again no empirical evidence is offered, that much of human 
activity is of this sort.  Because of this he is more an Austrian in methodology than he is a Chicago 
School man, though his Ph.D. degree is from that institution and for ideological reasons he is often 
associated with the latter group.  Thus, for all intents, Buchanan is a skeptic towards the 
econometrician as an advisor to the politician.  Simply put, he holds that one cannot measure cost 
because the relevant numbers do not objectively exist, except under perfectly competitive and 
repetitive circumstances.  Clearly, many policy areas are outside such market congenial situations.  
Such a revolutionary view enjoys little support however, even among Buchanan’s many followers, 
with the exception of small groups of neo-Austrians.  My own feeling is that every average to good 
economist should be persuaded to read Cost and Choice (B5) and every bad economist should be 
persuaded to read something else.   
 
C. Methodological  Individualism3 and the Economics of Politics 
 
Before Buchanan’s writing became generally known in the late 1950s, it was common to use the term 
“state” as if such an organic unit of decision-making existed.  Kenneth Arrow and he were leaders in 
dispelling that erroneous paradigm, though for wholly different reasons (A6, A10) and never in any 
sort of collaboration.  From his earlier writings (B2, A1, A6, A7, A10, C1, C2, C3, O1) Buchanan has 
                                                      
3 Buchanan explores the concept of “methodological individualism,” first coined by Karl Popper, in depth in 
articles collected in his Fiscal Theory and Political Economy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961).  




argued that politics was essentially amenable to the same analysis as markets.  Thus, individuals 
organize politically into interest groups to seek their own individual, not social ends- though lately he 
allows there is an indication that some degree of public-spiritedness may drive some public decision-
makers because of the moral constraint (A36, C29).  Still, even here the focus is on the individual 
interacting with a group.   
 
Contrast this to the methodology of “holism” so characteristic of the English language writings 
before the 1960s, which I term Victorian Welfare Economics.  Following Alfred Marshall and A. C. 
Pigou, this policy paradigm looks to a benign state, directed by selfless and competent technicians, to 
solve serious matters of mis-coordination and the mal-distribution of income.  Buchanan criticized 
this as far back as 1949 in his first journal article (A1).  Following in the intellectual footsteps of his 
teacher Frank Knight (C9), he gave a theoretical structure to Knight’s views, while grafting them 
onto those of Knut Wicksell, which he later translated as “A New Principle of Just Taxation,” (T1).  
He also melded these views with the 19th and early 20th Century Italians who, along with Adam 
Smith, Wicksell, and Knight, are his intellectual heroes (A3, C3).  Had he never written more than 
this, these several papers on methods Buchanan would have done as much as or more than any 20th 
Century scholar to bring positive theory to bear upon political decisions.   
 
To give a specific and more recent example of this leadership, I direct the reader to Buchanan’s 
Southern Economic Association presidential address, “What Should Economist Do?” (A17), a useful 
piece of sensible and original (adjectives not always joined at one go) instruction to our profession.  
Because its message has so penetrated the current methodology and scope of economics, a young 
economist who reads it today may find it obvious.  In November 1963, when the speech was given at 
the Hotel Roanoke in Roanoke, Virginia, I can assure the reader that the ideas were revolutionary.  I 
know.  I was in the audience.  His message was aimed at an intellectual world dominated by 
methodological holism- the opposite of methodological individualism, social welfare functions,  
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golden age growth paths, and ad hoc consumption functions.  I should add that because of the 
power of his views some of Buchanan’s methodology papers are known to non-economist scholars 
as well or better today than to economists (C7, C8).   
 
D.  Welfare Price Theory  
 
Buchanan is an accomplished and creative price theorist, especially considering the time period that 
most of his articles were written.  His earliest effort, on quantity discounts (A5), indicated a keen 
understanding of what sorts of institutions were characterized by price-taking and those that were 
better understood by what is now called complex-contracting.  This awareness of the difference 
between price-taking and complex price-making is one to which all public finance persons of 
erudition are introduced in his treatise, The Demand and Supply of Public Good (B4).  Unfortunately, as I 
read the Journal of Political Economy and Bell/Rand Journal of Economics today I see few citations to 
Buchanan on these distinctions, but instead to younger mathematical theorists who had not the 
slightest inkling of complex-contracting back in 1968.  Alas, we soon forget. 
 
There is another dimension of Buchanan’s work, however, that also is not recognized, but should be.  
Along with Ronald Coase, he and Gordon Tullock popularized the notion of exchange and side-
payments in complex market and political processes (B2).  Buchanan, then chairman of his 
department at the University of Virginia and director of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Study 
of Political Economy, gathered Coase and Tullock, (along with Warren Nutter and Leland Yeager) in 
Charlottesville in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  His 1961 paper (A12) on majority rule as well as his 
1962 one (A14) on Paretian policy analysis used this Coasian approach and, in my opinion, Buchanan 
and possible others in the Virginia School are, if not unacknowledged co-discoverers of the Coase 
theorem, at least “complementary factors” in its production.  I am fairly certain of this for as a post-
doctoral fellow at Virginia I had access to all the working paper series and perused many of them.  
The Calculus of Consent appears to have begun as two separate and unpublished manuscripts—a Theory  
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of Entrepreneurial Politics (c. 1956) by Tullock and later his A General Theory of Politics (1958), as well as 
some working papers of Buchanan’s later published articles (A6, A7).  All of these had a Coasian 
flavor and later paralleled Coase’s two enormous contributions (Coase 1959,1960) where the “Coase 
theorem” took its original form. 
 
Perhaps it does not really matter who exactly at Virginia in the late 1950s and early 1960s extended 
our understanding of social interactions so dramatically.  Buchanan et Cie. pushed the notion of 
exchange to government, to the common law, to constitutions, and even to philosophy.  If not a 
scientific revolution, it certainly was a signal methodological advance.  Anyone who read The Calculus 
of Consent (B2) shortly after it was published knew he was reading a classic.  I surely did as a graduate 
student in 1962.  It is still ranked among the most important books in politics and economics 
(Downing and Stafford, 1981) in this century-for its positive analysis as well as for its normative and 
historic doctrinal exercises (see especially The Calculus Appendix 1 by Buchanan and Appendix 2 by 
Tullock).   
 
Buchanan’s work on externality (A15), clubs (A20), joint supply (A22) and his work extending 
Tiebout’s model (A26, C12) are classics, too.  Also well known are his two earliest works on 
federalism, mobility, and political competition (A2, A4), which are clear complements to another 
acknowledged classic in public choice (Downing and Stafford, 1981), Charles Tiebout’s “A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditure.”  Buchanan’s use of the common property model with Francisco 
Forte (A10) in a public spending context is an early exercise in the dissipative costs of rent seeking 
and common property.  Even today he still shows virtuosity in price theory, drawing subtle 
inferences about the world using comparative static’s embedded in extremely complex social 




In my opinion, Buchanan’s contributions are nearly on par with Stigler’s or Friedman’s price-theory.  
Together they give support to what was always conceded in the North American academy in the 
Fifties and Sixties: one may not have liked Chicago-UCLA-Virginia style policy analyses, but one had 
to admire the ability of its practitioners to use simple price theory to get positive, non-intuitive, and, 
above all else, non-trivial implications.  Buchanan has contributed mightily to this reputation.   
 
E.  Rent-Seeking and Polity Failure 
 
Neither Buchanan nor his long-term colleague Tullock invented the term “rent-seeking.”  That 
honor goes to Anne Krueger for her 1974 paper, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society.”  Perhaps Shakespeare was right about the unimportance of names, since clearly the concept 
of rent seeking is originally a Virginia School construct.  Tullock explicitly offered the theory years 
earlier in his “The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft” (1968).  Still, years before that 
Buchanan argued that government is an organization where individuals could as well get together to 
rob their brethren as to seek the public weal (A1, A6, A7, A10, A12, A13, A14, C5).  His skepticism 
about treating transfers as Pigovian non-resource using spendings is in the mainstream today of 
concerns in assessing the costs of transfers, but in the Fifties he was alone in this position4.  He has 
devoted a lifetime to delineating the circumstances that distinguish the possibility for productive as 
opposed to dissipative policies and parsing out institutions that enhance the former and attenuate the 
latter.  In the 1950s, if one read Abram Bergson, Nicholas Kaldor, James Meade, Paul Samuelson, 
Tibor Scitovsky, and other typical well-known welfare economists, one got a wholly different 
impression of the state then one might today.  The state, said these latter day Victorian welfare 
economists, was a device to internalize the bads and supply the social goods.  I think no reputable 
                                                      
4 In his undergraduate public economics textbook (B10), which I read as a college senior in 1961, Buchanan 
clearly expresses his doubts that government transfer payments were truly costless transfers as Pigou suggested 
(1947).  Unfortunately, he did not flesh out this enough for me to understand at that time the rent-seeking 
implications.  I suspect he did not fully comprehend the enormity of his speculation at the time either.    
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economist would say that today.  I believe this change in perspective is in no small measure because 
of the work of Buchanan, his colleagues, and disciples.   
 
More than the Chicago Scholars who in the 1950s and 1960s railed against government interventions, 
Buchanan and his allies set out why government interventions were larded through with selfish and 
partially destructive influences—the desires to redistribute income for personal gain5.  This 
prophylactic against romantic policy analysis caused the profession to look more carefully at public 
institutions to see what mechanisms exist to internalize exchange within government operations and 
which are essentially predatory or parasitic.  Buchanan can be credited with taking the skepticism of 
the American Federalist Papers and giving it a rich theoretic structure (Appendix 1, B2 and elsewhere 
therein; B9).  I believe that his current writings on the problem (B9, A43, O4, C26, O6) are less 
debated today because at least part of his earlier message is so well understood.  The question now is 
how much rent-seeking accompanies the usual ‘triangular” measures of policy misallocation?   
Unfortunately, professional preoccupation over post-constitutional policy analysis still displaces 
attention away from pre-institutional issues, the area for serious debate.  This dichotomy is explored 
by Buchanan as by no other economist in this century save Friedrich Hayek, Knight, and Tullock and 
is discussed in the next part of this section.   
 
F.  Political Economy and Constitutions 
 
If Buchanan had never written anything more than The Calculus of Consent (B2), he and Tullock would 
be forever enshrined as the leaders of modern public choice.  The fact is his use of economic theory 
to model “pre-constitutional” decision-making –what has become known as constitutional 
economics- is a singular and overarching contribution to both the disciplines of economics and 
politics (A6, A7, A12, A13, A14).  I would argue that it is even more important than his research on 
“post-constitutional” choice, which takes political institutions as exogenous.  
                                                      
5 My impression of Chicago analysis of that era was that, except for Stigler, it explained costly social policy 




Earlier in the methodology part of this essay, I mentioned Buchanan’s individualistic approach to 
political choice, which Buchanan, along with Tullock, gave precise form in The Calculus.  Each 
chapter and each of the two appendices is a jewel of research, exploring the question of pre- and 
post-constitutional political choice.  The Calculus employs the transactions cost approach, weighing 
coordination gains of group choice against rent-seeking losses, while observing how various political 
institutions affect this calculus—majority rule, franchise extension, bi-cameralism, proportional 
representation, and the like.  According to a recent article in Public Choice (Downing and Stafford, 
1981), measured by citation counts The Calculus is among the most important of the books and 
articles written in the last thirty years on rigorous political economy—sharing honors with Arrow’s 
Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), and 
Duncan Black’s, A Theory of Committees and Elections (1958).  Unlike Black and Downs whose classics 
were followed by few other major contributions to the subject by the authors, Buchanan has built 
upon his research to develop a deeper understanding of politics.  These contributions are legion (B3, 
B7, B9, A16, A18, A24, A30, A31, A32, A41, A42, C13, C17, C18, C21, C22, C25, C28, C30), 
exploring every avenue of fiscal and regulatory politics, and nowadays even branching out into ethics 
and moral philosophy (O3, O5, O7), an application he more-or-less began in 1965 (A21).  In this 
latter area he is favorably compared with John Rawls and Robert Nozick, the two acknowledged 
leaders in the modern resurgence of moral philosophy.  As well, he has used this constitutional 
methodology to criticize Richard Posner’s call for efficiency considerations by common law judges 
(A29) as well as to explore the “rules vs. authority” controversy in monetary economics (B8, M3, M4, 
A42, C1, C16).  That he does all of this with fluidity and lucidity has made these writings not only 
cited, but also still read!   
 
Buchanan clearly relishes moving against the grain in his role as a moral philosopher.  Scott Gordon 
accused him in a famous review, “The New Contradictions” (1976), of committing the “naturalistic 
fallacy” of deriving an “ought” from an “is”.  Buchanan proudly accepted that indictment (O5,  
 
12
Chapter 9), claiming that ethical rules can be derived from the nature of man, a position my 
philosopher friends tell me is quite respectable today and whose implications are now much explored 
in their profession.  An acknowledged Hobbesian, Buchanan continues further in this little known 
paper (O5, Chapter 9)—delivered at the Public Choice Society meeting in 1977 and a classic piece of 
Buchananesque writing—to castigate his fellow economists for their unwillingness to look at the 
state and man as they are, rather than as they find it ideologically congenial or operationally 
convenient.   
 
In all his writings on political rules-of-the-game, Buchanan claims there is massive polity failure due 
to insensitivity of politicians as agents (bureaucrats and elected officials) to their principals (ordinary 
citizens), a sort of high transactions cost corruption of the democratic state.  The result is an 
excessively growing state, with diverse and numerous special interests feeding off the fiscal and 
regulatory commons.  This, he claims, is based on sound positive economics, and for those who see 
the facts his way, the policy “cure” is (a) serious constitutional reforms which raise the cost of 
politicians “cutting deals” with entrenched, privileged clienteles, and (b) competition from private 
contractors to limit the monopolistic practices of bureaucrats and amongst themselves.  Needless to 
say, not all members of the Public Choice Society find the system so transactionally biased, nor do 
they consider his prescriptions normatively wise.  It is safe to say, however, that most find themselves 
required to rethink the foundations of their models every time this radical political economy theorist 
takes his powerful mind to the topic6.   
 
Because of his pessimistic view of democratic politics, Buchanan everywhere finds himself at odds 
with the new Panglossian interpretation of policy; to wit: it is always optimal.  This view, termed the 
New-New Welfare Economics, and associated most prominently with Nobel Prize winner George 
                                                      
6 One prominent public choice economist whose views definitely changed because of Buchanan and his 
Virginia School colleagues is Mancur Olson.  One need only compare his 1965 and 1983 treatises to see this 
attitudinal shift.    
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Stigler (1982) and his Chicago colleague Gary Becker (1976), argues that institutions develop so as to 
minimize the sum of deadweight and transactions costs.  A form of modern Social Darwinism, 
Buchanan finds such a deterministic interpretation implausible.  He firmly believes that ideas and 
their embodiment in ideology matter and he sides with other Nobel Prize winners around the 
position that useful and clear economic analysis is a form of public good that policy makers can 
abuse, but on the whole can employ for good, a position he shares with past Nobelists much 
different from him in philosophical outlook, Kenneth Arrow, and James Meade, as well as those in 
the Chicago School, Milton Friedman and Theodore Schultz.   
 
Buchanan is unique, among economists, however, in that he holds post-constitutional policy analysis 
largely uninteresting.  Thus, to devote a great deal of energy to pointing out that tariffs do more harm 
to consumers than the good to the protected agents of production seems unuseful to him, since the 
protectionists often have the margin of votes in the legislature.  The answer is to move back to the 
study of constitutional choice issues.  Thus, he is more an American Madisonian than a Chicago 
School scholar.  As I said before in the penultimate part of this section, Buchanan’s message still 
does not seem to get through on this front to most in the profession, who continue to think that 
Kaldor-Hicks arguments favoring efficient policy are necessarily politically persuasive.  I am unsure 
why such naiveté persists, but I will predict that because of Buchanan and his colleagues such 
Victorian welfare economics will not likely persist another decade or two. 
 
3.  A SUMMING UP  
 
Although J. B. Clark warned us about the use of the marginal product theory in making judgments 
about the social worth of individuals, he nonetheless would not object to asking what we would have 
missed in our discipline without Buchanan’s contributions.  Had contemplation of the Second World 
War not prompted him to take a commission in the U.S. Navy in late 1941, he might have left 
Tennessee with his M.A. for Columbia to take up a doctoral fellowship to study statistics and  
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econometrics under Harold Hotelling.  Given Buchanan’s well-known (dis)tastes on such empirical 
matters, I fear the profession would have not kept him long.  Inside ten books, over one hundred 
full-length articles, seventy book reviews, and fifty comments, replies, notes and public testimonies 
are several crucial ideas that might not have been developed by others, at least for some time—the 
notion of politics as a rational choice process, the view of choice of rules as a derived demand related 
to and depending on predicted behavior under these rules; the concept of complex-contracting in 
group decisions; the idea of private wants served by public means; the principal-and-agent conflict in 
the carrying out of policy; and finally, the choice of ethical rules as the equivalent of moral capital.   
 
Further lost would have been his creation of the Virginia School, whose heyday in the 1950s and 
1960s brought together the likes of Coase, Nutter, Tullock, Yeager, and himself.  In addition, the 
Virginia School trained a host of distinguished scholars such as J. Ronnie Davis, Otto Davis, Charles 
Goetz, David Johnson, Cotton Mather Lindsay, James Miller, Mark Pauly, Charles Plott, Paul Craig 
Roberts, William Craig Stubblebine, Robert Tollison, Richard Wagner, and Thomas Willett.  During 
his tenure at Virginia and Virginia Tech he influenced at least as many active researchers- some early 
in their careers- who were privileged to spend time there.  While I can only guess at this list, I would 
include, besides myself, Peter Bernholz, the late Winston Bush, William Breit, Geoffrey Brennan, 
Mark Crain, Arthur Denzau, Harold Hochman, Dwight Lee, Robert Mackay, Dennis Mueller, Earl 
Thompson, Edward West, and Andrew Whinston.  (I will probably regret putting these lists to paper, 
since important names are doubtless forgotten.) 
 
Given the nature of scientific discovery, substitutes for the absence of Buchanan’s scholarship—and 
his influence as a colleague and teacher— surely would have been found.  The history of science 
even in the informationally non-integrated ancient and medieval world confirms this time and again.  
But substitutions are never perfect and are always costly.  Our profession would have been the 




I personally wish that Buchanan’s thinking was more congenial to empirical work and that he 
devoted more of his valuable skills to positive economics, especially in the last decade.  Of course, 
zero-price druthers are readily indulged.  Nonetheless, many of his intellectual sons and daughters, 
even grandchildren, have pursued this less normative path to good effect.  Scholars at Cal Tech, 
Carnegie-Mellon, Claremont, George Mason, Rochester, Washington University, and University of 
Washington continuously and rigorously explore Buchananite themes, as do others in less public 
choice concentrated institutions.  I dare say he does not always approve of his progenies’ research 
agendas.  All quibbles need to be set aside here.  Even Buchanan’s rational expectationist critics 
practicing the New-New Welfare Economics admit their methodological debt to him, as do 
economists of wholly different political persuasions who find his stated constitutional prescriptions 




1.  Robert J. Barro.  “Comments from and Unreconstructed Ricardian.”  Journal of Monetary 
Economics (Aug. 1978). 
 
2.  ________ and David M. Gordon.  “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate 
Model.”  Journal of Political Economy (Aug. 1983). 
 
3.  Gary Becker.  “ Comment: Toward a More General Thoery of Regulation,” The Journal of 
Law and Economics (Aug. 1976). 
 
4. ________.    The Economic Approach to Human Behavior.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1976. 
 
5.  Mark Blaug.  “Buchanan, James M.”  In Blaug, Great Economists since Keynes.  Totowa, N.J.: 
Barnes and Nobel, 1985. 
 
6.  Ronald H. Coase, “The Federal Communications Commission,” The Journal of Law and 
Economics (1959). 
7. ____________,  “The  Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics (1960).  
 
8.  P.B. Dowing and E.A. Stafford, “Citations as an Indicator of Classic Works and Major 
Contributions in Social Choice,” Public Choice (No. 2, 1981). 
 
9.  H. Scott Gordon, “The New Contradictions,” Journal of Political Economy (June, 1976). 
 
10.  Anne Krueger, “The Political Economy of a Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 
(June, 1974). 
 
11.  Gareth Locksley.  “Individuals, Contracts and Constitutions: The Political Economy of 
James M. Buchanan.”  In J.R. Shackelton and Gareth Locksley (eds.), Twelve Contemporary 
Economists.  London: Macmillan Press, 1981.   
 
12.  Dennis C. Mueller.  “On Buchanan.”  In H.W. Spiegel and W.J. Samuels (eds.), Contemporary 
Economists in Perspective.  Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1984. 
 
13. Mancur  Olson,  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.  Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1965. 
 
14. ______,  The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidity.  New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. 
 
15.  A.C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance.  3rd Ed., London: Macmillan, 1947. 
 
16.  George Stigler.  The Economist as Preacher and Other Essays.  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982. 
 
17.  Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy (Oct., 
1956). 
 
18.  Gordon Tullock, “The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft,” Western Economic 
Journal (now Economic Inquiry) (May 1968).  
 
17
V. KEY WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 





B1.   Public Principle of Public Debt.  Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1958 
 
B2.  The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.  With Gordon 
Tullock.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962.   
 
B3.  Public Finance in a Democratic Process.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1966 
 
B4.  The Demand and Supply of Public Goods.  Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968. 
 
B5.  Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory.  Chicago: Markham Press, 1969. 
 
B6.  Academia in Anarchy: An Economic Diagnosis.  With Nicos E. Devletoglou.  New York: 
Basic Books, 1970. 
 
B7.  The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Utopia.  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1975 
 
B8.  Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes.  With Richard E. Wagner.  New 
York: Academic Press, 1977. 
 
B9.  The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution.  With H. Geoffrey 
Brennan.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
 
B10.  The Public Finances.  Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1960.  Current and 5th edition 






M1.  The Inconsistencies of the National Health Services.  London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 1965 
 
M2.  Public Debt in a Democratic Society.  With Richard E. Wagner.  Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1967 
 
M3.  The Consequences of Mr. Keynes.  With John Burton and Richard E. Wagner.  London: 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978 
 
M4.  Monopoly in Money and Inflation: The Case for a Constitution to Discipline Government.  With 







ARTICLES IN JOURNALS 
 
A1.  “The Pure Theory of Public Finance: A Suggested Approach,” Journal of Political 
Economy (Dec. 1949), 496-505. 
 
A2.  “Federalism and Fiscal Equity,” American Economic Review (Sept. 1950), 583-99. 
 
A3.  “Knut Wickwell on Marginal Cost Pricing,” Southern Economic Journal (Oct. 1951), 
173-78. 
 
A4.  “Federal Grants and Resource Allocation,” Journal of Political Economy (June 1952), 
208-17. 
 
A5.  “The Theory of Monopolistic Quantity Discounts,” Review of Economic Studies (June 
1953), 199-208. 
 
A6.  “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets,” Journal of Political Economy (Apr. 
1954), 114-23. 
 
A7.  “Individual Choice in Voting and the Market,” Journal of Political Economy (Aug. 
1954), 334-43. 
 
A8.  “Private Ownership and Common Usage,” Southern Economic Journal (Jan. 1956), 305-
16. 
 
A9.  “Ceteris Paribus: Notes on Methodology,” Southern Economic Journal (Jan. 1958), 259-
70. 
 
A10.  “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy,” Journal of Law 
and Economics (Oct. 1959), 124-38. 
 
A11.  “The Evaluation of Public Services,” Journal of Political Economy (Apr. 1961), 107-21, 
with F. Forte. 
 
A12.  “Simple Majority Voting, Game Theory and Resource Use,” Canadian Journal of 
Economic and Political Science (Aug. 1961), 337-48. 
 
A13.  “Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins,” Economica (Feb. 1962), 17-28. 
 
A14.  “The Relevance of Pareto Optimality,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (Dec. 1962), 341-
54. 
 
A15.  “Externality,” With W.C. Stubblebine, Economica (Nov. 1962), 371-84. 
 
A16.  “The Economics of Earmarked Taxes,” Journal of Political Economy (Oct. 1963), 457-
69. 
 
A17.  “What Should Economists Do?”  Southern Economic Journal (Jan. 1964), 213-22. 
 
A18.  “Fiscal Institutions and Efficiency in Collective Outlay,” American Economic Review 




A19.  “Fiscal Choice through Time,” with F. Forte.  National Tax Journal (June 1964), 144-
57. 
 
A20.  “An Economic Theory of Clubs,” Economica (Feb. 1965), 1-14. 
 
A21.  “Ethical Rules, Expected Values, and Large Numbers,” Ethics (Oct. 1965), 1-13. 
 
A22.  “Externality in Tax Response,” Southern Economic Journal (July 1966), 35-42. 
 
A23.  “Joint Supply, Externality, and Optimality,” Economies (Nov. 1966), 406-15. 
 
A24.  “On the Incidence of Tax Deductibility.”  With Mark Pauly.  National Tax Journal 
(June 1970), 157-67.   
 
A25.  “External Diseconomies in Competitive Supply.”  With Charles J. Goetz.  American 
Economic Review (Dec. 1971), 883-90. 
 
A26.  “Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility,” With Charles J. Goetz.  Journal of Public 
Economics (No. 1, 1972), 25-43. 
 
A27.  “Politics, Property and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. 
Schoene,” Journal of Law and Economics (Oct. 1972), 439-52. 
 
A28.  “The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State,” Natural Resources Journal (Oct. 
1973), 579-94. 
 
A29.  “Good Economies—Bad Law,” Virginia Law Review (Spring 1974), 483-92. 
 
A30.  “Polluters, Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls v. Taxes.”  With Gordon 
Tullock.  American Economic Review (March 1975), 139-47.   
 
A31.  “Public Choice and Public Finance,” National Tax Journal (Dec. 1975), 383-04. 
 
A32.  “Taxation in Fiscal Exchange,” Journal of Public Economics (No. 1, 1976), 1-16. 
 
A33.  “The Justice of Natural Liberty,” Journal of Legal Studies (Jan. 1976), 1-16. 
 
A35.  “Toward a Tax Constitution for Leviathan.”  With H. Geoffrey Brennan.  Journal of 
Public Economics (Dec. 1977), 255-74.   
 
A36.  “Market States, and the Extent of Morals,” American Economic Review (May 1978), 
364-68.   
 
A37.  “The Logic of Tax Limits.”  With H. Geoffrey Brennan.  National Tax Journal (June 
1979)   
 
A38.  “The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs.”  With Robert D. Tollison.  
American Economic Review (Mar. 1981), 28-38. 
 
A39.  “Revenue Implications of Money Creation Under Leviathan,” American Economic 




A40.  “Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externality.”  With Roger Faith.  
Journal of Law and Economics (Mar. 1981), 95-111. 
 
A41.  “Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Political Equilibrium: Some Simple Analytics.”  
With Dwight P. Lee.  Economic Inquiry (July 1982), 3443-54.   
 
A42.  “Predictive Power and Choice among Regimes,” Economic Journal (Mar. 1983), 89-
105. 
 
A43.  “Rent Seeking, Non-Compensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession,” Journal of 




CONTRIBUTIONS TO BOOKS 
 
 
C1.  “Comparative Tax Analysis and Economic Methodology.”  In James M. Buchanan, 
Fiscal Theory and Political Economy.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1961, pp. 151-69. 
 
C2.  “The Methodology of Incidence Theory: A Critical Review of Some Recent 
Controversies.”  In Buchanan, Fiscal Theory, pp. 125-50. 
 
C3.  “’La scienza delle finanze’: The Italian Tradition in Fiscal Theory.”  In Buchanan 
(ed.), Fiscal Theory, pp. 24-74. 
 
C4.  “Predictability: The Criterion for Monetary Constitution.”  In Leland B. Yeager 
(ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 
pp. 155-83. 
 
C5.  “Concerning Future Generations.”  In James M. Ferguson (ed.), Pubic Debt and 
Future Generations.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964, pp. 55-63. 
 
C6.  “Public Debt, Cost Theory, and the Fiscal Illusion.”  In Ferguson, Public Debt, pp. 
150-62. 
 
C7.  “Economics and Its Scientific Neighbors.”  In Sherman Krop (ed.), The Structure of 
Economic Science.  Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 166-83. 
 
C8.  “An Individualistic Theory of Political Process.”  In David Easton (ed.), Varieties of 
Political Theory.  Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 166-83. 
 
C9.  “Frank H. Knight.”  Biographical article, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
1968, pp. 424-28. 
 
C10.  “Public Debt.”  International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, pp. 28-34. 
 
C11.  “Is Economics a Science of Choice?”  In Erich Streissler (ed.), Roads to Freedom:  




C12.  “An Efficiency Basis for Federal Fiscal Equalization.”  With Richard E. Wagner.  In 
J. Margolis (ed.), The Analysis of Public Output.  New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1970, pp. 139-56. 
 
C13.  “Before Public Choice.”  In Gordon Tullock (ed.), Explorations in the Theory of 
Anarchy.  Blacksburg: Center for Study of Public Choice, 1972, pp. 27-37. 
 
C14.  “The Political Economy of Franchise in the Welfare State.”  In Richard T. Selden 
(ed.), Capitalism and Freedom: Problems and Prospects Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 1975, pp. 52-77. 
 
C15.  “Inflation and Real Rates of Income Tax.”  With James Dean.  Proceedings of the 67th 
Annual National Tax Association on Taxation.  Columbus: National Tax Association, 
1975, pp. 343-49. 
 
C16.  “Gold, Money, and the Law: The Limits of Governmental Monetary Authority.”  
With Nicholas Tideman.  In Henry G. Manne and Roger L. Miller (eds.), Gold, 
Money, and the Law.  Chicago: Aldine Press, 1975, pp. 9-70. 
 
C17.  “Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution.”  With Winston C. Bush.  In 
Arthur Denzau and Robert Mackay (eds.), Essays on Unorthodox Economic Strategies.  
Blacksburg: Center for the Study of Public Choice, 1976, pp. 57-64. 
 
C18.  “Political Equality and Private Property: The Distributional Paradox.”  In G. 
Dworkin et al. (eds.), Market and Morals.  Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere Publishing, 
1977, pp. 69-84. 
 
C19.  “Why Does Government Grow?”  In Thomas E. Borcherding (ed.), Budgets and 
Bureaucrats: the Sources of Government Growth.  Durham: Duke University Press, 1977, 
pp. 3-18. 
 
C20.  “Public Goods and Natural Liberty.”  In Thomas Wilson and Andrew Skinner 
(eds.), The Market and the State: Essays in Honor of Adam Smith.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978, pp. 271-86. 
 
C21.  “The Justice of Natural Liberty.”  In Fred Glahe (ed.), Adam Smith and the Wealth of 
Nations.  Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1978, pp. 61-82. 
 
C22.  “From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy: Notes on the Development of 
Public Choice.”  In Buchanan, et al., the Economies of Politics.  London: Institute for 
Economic Affairs, 1978, pp.1-20. 
 
C23.  “The Economic Constitution and the New Deal.”  In Gary Walton (ed.), Regulatory 
Change in an Atmosphere of Crisis.  New York: Academic Press, 1979, pp. 13-26. 
 
C24.  “A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle.”  In Karl Bruner 
(ed.), Economics and Social Institutions.  Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, pp. 59-78. 
 
C25.  “On Some Fundamental Issues in Political Economy: An Exchange of 
Correspondence.”  With Warren Samuels.  In W. Samuels (ed.), the Methodology of 




C26.  “Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking.”  In James M. Buchanan, Robert Tollison and 
Gordon Tullock (eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society.  College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1980, pp. 3-15. 
 
C27.  “The Domain of Subjective Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral 
Philosophy.”  In Israel M. Kirzner (ed.), Method, Process, and Austrian Economies: Essays 
in Honor of Ludwig von Mises.  Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1982, pp.7-20. 
 
C28.  “Constitutional Contract in Capitalism.”  In Sveotar Pejovich (ed.), Philosophical and 
Economic Foundations of Capitalism.  Lexington: Lexington Books, 1983, pp. 65-69. 
 
C29.  “Moral Community and Moral Order: The Intensive and Extensive Limits of 
Interaction.”  In H. Miller and W. Williams (eds.), Ethics and Animals.  Clifton, N.J.: 
Humane Press, 1983, pp. 95-102. 
 
C30.  “The Tax System as Social Overhead Capital.”  In Karl Roskamp (ed.), Public Finance 
and Economic Growth.  Proceedings of the 37th Congress of the International Institute 








S1.  “Criteria for Government Expenditures,” Journal of Finance (Dec. 1951), 440-42 
 
S2.  “Wicksell on Fiscal Reform,” American Economic Review (Sept. 1972), 599-602 
 
S3.  “Saving and the Rate of Interest,” Journal of Political Economy (Feb. 1959), 58-61. 
 
S4.  “Confessions of a Burden Monger,” Journal of Political Economy (Oct. 1964), 486-88. 
 
S5.  “The Icons of Public Debt,” Journal of Political Economy (Sept. 1966), 544-46. 
 
S6.  “What Kind of Redistribution Do We Want?”  Economica (May 1968), 185-90. 
 
S7.  “External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure,” American 
Economic Review (Mar. 1969), 174-77. 
 
S8.  “Barro on Ricardian Equivalence,” Journal of Political Economy (Apr. 1976), 337-42. 
 
S9.  “Adam Smith on Public Choice,” Public Choice (Spring 1976), 81-82. 
 
S10.  “Monetary Research, Monetary Rubs, and Monetary Regimes,” The Cato Journal 









OTHER WRITINGS IN BOOKS  
EDITED BY BUCHANAN 
 
 
O1.  Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economies.  With Robert D. Tollison.  
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972. 
  Chapter 2, “Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems.”  
  Chapter 5, “Easy Budgets and Tight Money.”  
  Chapter 6, “Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Preference.” 
  Chapter 12, “A Public Choice Approach to Public Utility Pricing.’ 
 




O3.  Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspective of a Political Economist.  College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1977.  
  Chapter 1, “A Contractorian Perspective on Anarchy.” 
  Chapter 2, “Law and the Invisible Hand.” 
  Chapter 4, “The Libertarians Legitimacy of the State.”  
  Chapter 5, “Politics and Science.” 
  Chapter 7, “Politics, Property, and the Law.” 
  Chapter 9, “Notes on Justice in Contract.”  
  Chapter 10, “The Use and Abuse on Contract.” 
  Chapter 16, “A Contractorian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory.” 
 
O4.  Fiscal Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy.  With Richard E. Wagner.  Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1978. 
  Chapter 1, “Contemporary Democracy and the Prospect for Fiscal Control: Initial 
Thoughts about and Final Reaction to the Conference.”  
  Chapter 5, “The Political Biases of Keynesian Economics.” 
 
O5.  What Should Economists Do?  Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979. 
  Chapter 3, “Professor Alchian on Economic Method.”  
  Chapter 4, “General Implications of Subjectivism in Economics.” 
  Chapter 5, “Natural and Artifactual Man.” 
  Chapter 8, “Foreword to Tullock’s the Politics of Bureaucracy.” 
  Chapter 9 “Notes on the History and Direction of Public Choice.” 
  Chapter 13, “Equality as Fact and Norm.” 
  Chapter 14, “Public Finance and Academic Freedom.” 
  Chapter 15, “Public Choice and Ideology.” 
  Chapter 17, “Democratic Values in Taxation.” 
  Chapter 18, “Taxation in Fiscal Exchange.” 
  Chapter 19, “Pragmatic Reform and Constitutional Revolution.” 
Chapter 20, “Criteria for a Free Society: Definition, Diagnosis and Prescription.” 
 
O6.  Towards a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society.  With Robert D. Tollison and Gordon 
Tullock, 1980.   
  Chapter 10, “Rent Seeking Under External Economies.” 




O7.  Theory of Public Choice-II.  With Robert D. Tollison.  Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1984. 
  “Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its 
Normative Implications,” pp. 11-22. 
  “Toward a Theory of Yes-No Voting.”  With Robert L. Faith, pp. 90-104. 
  “The Normative Purpose of Economic ‘Science’ Rediscovery of an Eighteenth 
Century Method.”  With H.G. Brennan, pp. 383-94. 




T1.  “A New Principle of Just Taxation,” taken, in part, from Knut Wicksell Finanz 
theoretische Uter suchugen (Jena, 1896) In R. A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock, 
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, London: Macmillon, 1958, pp. 72-118. 
 